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From the many studies on taxation’s effect upon charitable contributions arises
the stylized fact that the ‘tax-price’ (defined below) elasticity of giving exceeds unity.  If
true, then the federal policy of allowing households to deduct contributions from taxable
income causes more to be contributed than is lost to the treasury in foregone tax revenue.
Recent work using panels of tax data, however, suggests that the long-run tax price
elasticity may be substantially lower than unity.  In this case the deduction is inefficient
in that the long run loss to the federal treasury exceeds the gains to charities, so that it is
less costly for the government to remove the deduction and provide the funds or services
directly.
Here we address this issue using cross-sectional household data from the
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) to estimate the price elasticity of all deductible
contributions.  A common solution to problems caused by the large percentage of
noncontributors in the sample is to use, for example, methods such as Tobit or the two-
stage method of Heckman.  Specification tests, however, reject the assumptions necessary
for the consistency of these estimates. This casts doubt upon the result that tax-price
elasticities estimated with these maximum likelihood methods exceed unity, even when
using variables designed to capture the same long run features as the panel data.
When using the semiparametric method of Ahn and Powell (1993) – which
consistently estimates parameters without making analogous assumptions  – we find an
elasticity estimate similar to those found using panel data.  This suggests that high tax-2
price elasticities in previous work with cross-sectional data may be as much a function of
specification error as the lack of a time component.
However, our data allows us to estimate the elasticity of contributions to social
welfare organizations.  This more closely matches the definition of giving needed to
measure efficiency because the other major recipient of contributions, religious
organizations, cannot receive government expenditures as a substitute for private
donations. Semi-parametric estimates using this definition find an elasticity greater than
one.  Therefore, while it is possible that many previous estimates of the elasticity are too
high, the deduction for contributions may still be treasury efficient.
THE MODEL
We are interested in estimating a model of contributions Ci* :
(1) Ci* = ci(YibY + PibP + ZibZ + ei),
where Yi is permanent income, Zi is a vector of demographic variables and Pi is the tax-
price of charitable giving.  The variable ci represents a first stage in which the household
chooses to contribute if the utility U(Ci,Xi,Ti,Zi) from giving exceeds the utility from not
giving.  That is,
(2) ci = I[U(Ci*, Yi - Pi·Ci*, Ti, Zi) + ni > U(0, Yi, Ti, Zi)],
where the function I[•] is an indicator function equal to one if the condition is true and
zero otherwise and ni is independent and identically distributed (iid) with mean zero.
An variable unique to this first stage is Ti, the level of giving by the government.
Its inclusion solely in this stage arises from the idea that the individual has enough
information about Ti to make a first stage decision, but not enough to use in the second3
stage.   In the second stage giving by others must be evaluated in a cardinal ordering to
determine the precise number of dollars to contribute.  But it is unreasonable to believe
that households have this much information.  On the other hand in the first stage
households only need to know if either transfer payments are too high or too low.  If they
are too high then ceteris paribus the household doesn’t give and if too low it gives.
Using the standard model in the charitable giving literature, Ci*, Yi and Pi are
measured in natural logs.
1 The coefficients on these variables can therefore be interpreted
as elasticities.  One reason for interest in the price elasticity is the idea of “treasury
efficiency”.  The subsidy to contributions due to their deductibility is deemed “treasury
efficient” if the revenue loss to the treasury from the subsidy is less than the contributions
it induces. The removal of a treasury efficient subsidy while holding recipients harmless
to the change by substituting government payments would therefore result in a net loss to
the treasury.
The intuition relating this concept to price elasticity derives from observing that
for contributions C and a flat tax rate m, the treasury loses m·C from the deduction.  The























                                                
1 A dollar is added to contributions.4
where P = (1-m) for itemizers.  Therefore, a price elasticity greater than 1 in absolute
value indicates treasure efficiency.
2
ESTIMATION METHODS
Because a large proportion of the households make no contributions, using simple
generalized least squares on either the whole sample or on households that contribute will
produce inconsistent parameter estimates since ciei can be decomposed as follows:
(3) ciei = E(ei| I[Ui(Ci*) + ni > Ui(0)]) + hi
        = l(Yi,Pi, Ti, Zi) + hi
where hi has both a conditional and unconditional expectation equal to 0 and Ui(Ci*)
equals U(Ci*, Yi - Pi·Ci*, Ti, Zi).  Rewriting (1) as
(4) Ci* =ciYibY + ciPibP + ciZibZ + li + hi,
where li is l(Yi,Pi,Ti,Zi), we see that the residual (li + hi) can be correlated with the
regressors, requiring us to use an estimator accounting for this selection effect.  The tobit
technique is commonly used in the charitable giving literature to address this selection
effect.  Another useful method is the two-stage Heckman model in which li is estimated
using a probit model.  Both of these models make parametric assumptions about the
distribution of ci.
In addition to the sample selection problem we must include a correction for the
endogeneity of the price variable.  Because contributions are deductible from federal
taxation and the tax rate varies with income net of deductions, the tax rate facing the
                                                
2 Roberts (1987) notes that a small adjustment should be made to this figure to account for the change in contributions5
household tax-price may be written as
Pi(Yi, Ci) = 1 - dim(Yi-Ci)
where di is one if the household itemizes and zero otherwise, and m(￿) is the marginal tax
rate function. Therefore, because Pi is a function of Ci, it is correlated with ei.  The
standard solution to this problem is to use the “first dollar” tax price – the tax price if
contributions were zero – as an instrument for the “last dollar” tax price – the actual tax
price of the household.  We incorporate this solution into the tobit model by using the full
information maximum likelihood method described in Greene (1995).  This is essentially
a two equation system: one equation for the instrumental variable regression and one for
the charitable giving regression.  As an alternative we incorporate the instrumental
variable into the two-stage Heckman model by using the model of Lee, Maddala and
Trost (1980).  In this model there is a first stage selection equation and a second stage
system of equations similar to the Greene model.
One drawback to both the tobit and Heckman models is that a failure of the
distributional assumptions on ei and ni makes the model’s coefficient estimates biased
and inconsistent.  An alternative is use a semiparametric procedure whose estimates are
consistent without requiring specific densities for ei and ni.
To this end we use the two stage estimation procedure established by Ahn and
Powell (1993).  Unlike other semiparametric models such as those of Ichimura and Lee
(1991) or Chen and Lee (1998), the estimates from this method do not depend upon
starting values selected by the researcher.  The primary advantage of Ahn and Powell
                                                                                                                                                
caused by a change in transfers, but we ignore this effect here because we assume that contributors do not have enough6
(1993), however, is that there is no requirement to specify a parametric model of the
index component ci in (2).
Instead, the Ahn and Powell method estimates the index ci using a kernel
regression.  Unlike the Heckman method, the results from the first stage are then used to
create weights in the estimation of (4) using first differences of the data:
(5) Cij*=[cY]ijbY + [cP]ijbP + [cZ]ijbZ + lij + hij,
where, for example, [cY]ij =ciYi - cjYj and lij = li - lj.
3  The essential idea of Ahn and
Powell is to use weights that are largest when lij is closest to zero and smallest when lij is
furthest from zero.  The selection effect is then reduced and, asymptotically, eliminated.
Formally, if the weights wijn satisfy the regularity conditions in Appendix 1 and the
following properties:
(6)
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then a generalized weighted least square regression of (5) produces consistent parameter
estimates.  Since the lack of parametric assumptions prevents us from identifying lij, wijn
must be a function of something that is one-to-one with lij.  If this is the case, then lij
being close to zero implies that wijn will be non-zero.
To solve this problem, Ahn and Powell  suggest that one nonparametrically
estimate:
Pr(ci =1|Yi,Pi,Ti,Zi) =F(Yi,Pi,Ti,Zi) ” Fi
                                                                                                                                                
information about government expenditures to set the level of giving.
3 A sample of size 100 would then become a sample of size 100￿99/2=495.7
where ci is defined in (2) as one for contributors and zero otherwise.  Ahn and Powell
then argue that | Fi - Fj| > |F h - Fk| implies lij > lhk, in which case Fij is one-to-one with
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Then if Fi is close to Fj, by definition Pr[ni > Ui(0)-Ui(Ci*)] is close to Pr[nj > Uj(0) -
Uj(Cj*)].  But because ni is assumed to come from an i.i.d. distribution, if the
probabilities are close it must be the case that Ui(0)-Ui(Ci*) is close to Uj(0)-Uj(Cj*).
This implies that the lower limit of the integrals in the numerators are close and therefore
the numerators are close.  If both the numerators and denominators of li and lj are close,
then li and lj themselves are close.
Thus, the Ahn and Powell method uses a kernel regression estimate of Fi in the
first stage,  in F ˆ , where the sample size subscript notes that this estimate is a function of
sample size.  This is estimated as:
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where hn is the window width (or “bandwidth”) that approaches zero as the n approaches
infinity and in our application K(￿) is the standard normal kernel.  Larger window widths
create smoother regressions weighting observations more evenly.  Smaller window
widths create more flexible regressions by weighting observations near to i much more
than distant observations.  Letting8
(7) jn in ijn F F F ˆ ˆ ˆ - = ,
we use the left-hand side of (7) as the argument to a weighting function
(8) $ ( $ / ) w ijn ijn n K F b =
where  $ wijn is the nonparametric estimator of wijnand satisfies the properties in (6).
Because the window width bn converges to zero as n converges to infinity, for any
nonzero constant c, limnﬁ¥K(c/bn)=0.  These conditions alone are sufficient for  $ wijnto
satisfy the conditions outlined in (6).
Denoting Xi as the regressors to (5), and Vi as Xi except for the use of the first-
dollar price as an instrument for the last dollar price, the parameter estimates to (4) are:
(9) $ ( $ ) $ b =
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The resemblance of (9) to the standard instrumental variable estimator is reassuring and
one can now readily see the intuition behind the consistency of (9).  As the sample size
increases, the differences in (10) and (11) that have nonzero selection effects, l ij, have
weights that converge to zero.  Asymptotically, the only observations receiving weights
are those for which the selection effect is zero and therefore the parameter estimates are
consistent. However, there are three additional issues that need to be addressed when
implementing this estimator.9
First, this estimator requires the use of two kernel estimators which require order
conditions to guarantee the consistency of the parameter estimates.  Our initial
implementation carefully ensured that the kernels satisfied the Ahn and Powell's order
conditions listed in Appendix 1.  This was later abandoned for a simple normal kernel
because the parameter estimates were, as predicted by Powell, Stock, and Stoker (1989),
discontinuous functions of the bandwidth.  Aside from the difficulty in meeting the order
conditions one cannot satisfy the convergence conditions on the bandwidth in a single
sample.  Thus, we are faced with the problem of choosing the bandwidths.
The most common solution to this second problem is to “cross-validate” by
choosing the bandwidth that minimizes the out-of-sample mean square error.  This
implied balancing between bias and variance makes sense in a model producing predicted
values without parameter estimates.  Here, however, cross validation is inappropriate for
two reasons.  First, our goal is to get a consistent estimate of bp and so choosing
bandwidths to trade-off bias and variance in the predicted value of Ci* is of no value.
Even asymptotically cross validation is questionable because the cross validated window
width would converge at a rate such that the order of bias in the nonparametric estimators
equals the order of the variance.  This could easily violate the bandwidth regularity
conditions described in Appendix 1.
4  Second, the computational burden of cross-
validation is very high: at ten minutes per regression it takes about 16 days to generate
the out-of-sample mean square error for a single pair of bandwidths.
A third problem involves estimation of the covariance matrix.  In this study our
goal is to conduct hypothesis tests on the coefficients in (4).  Unfortunately, Ahn and10
Powell did not formally prove the consistency of their covariance matrix estimator.  In
addition, it is a fourth order U-statistic of kernel derivatives and therefore
computationally burdensome.
We address the problems arising from using a simple kernel, bandwidth selection
and the difficulty in performing hypothesis tests with a nonparametric bootstrap, using
the percentile bootstrap method of Hall (1992). Following MacKinnon and Smith (1998),
we use the bootstrap to estimate the finite sample bias from using a simple kernel and
selecting a bandwidth without cross-validation, which is then subtracted from the
parameter estimates.  The bootstrap thus aids the use of a simple kernel and our
bandwidth selection method, described below, by reducing the finite sample bias inherent
in nonlinear estimators. It also relieves the problem of hypothesis testing by allowing us
to construct confidence intervals.
Denoting a = .05 as the significance level of these confidence intervals, we
choose B=999 samples from the original sample using sampling with replacement.  These
choices make (a/2)(B+1) an integer so that the 50th largest and smallest coefficient
estimates correspond to the .05 and .95 percentiles.  Letting j index the bootstrap sample,
we denote the j
th estimated parameter vector by b j
* and the estimated finite sample bias as
b.  Then
b b b b







Our bias corrected estimate is then
$ $ $ * b b b b 0 2 = - = - b
                                                                                                                                                
4 See Singh and Ullah (1985) about the properties of cross validated window widths.11
and the confidence interval around this estimate is [ $ , $ ] /
*
/
* 2 2 1 2 2 b b b b a a - + - .
5
DATA
Our data set is taken from the 1982-1984 CEX Interview database (see U. S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (1986) for more information). The CEX is a rotating panel
survey that may begin in any month of the year for a given participating household; for
example, a household's survey year may run from June 1983 through May 1984.   Unlike
data derived from tax files, the survey contains information on specific household
consumption expenditures such as charitable contributions by type of organization (e.g.
religious, civic, etc.), demographic attributes of the household members, location, income
by source, and other attributes which affect income tax burdens at the federal, state and
local levels.
From the CEX, we draw a sample that includes single person households,
husband/wife couples without children, and husband/wife couples with one or more of
their own children. Residents of Alaska and Hawaii are deleted, as well as retirees, oc-
cupants of student housing, and households that moved during their survey period.  In
addition, households believed by the interviewer to have answered incompletely all
questions pertaining to current income are eliminated, as are those few reporting
contributions drastically in excess of their incomes.  The remaining households that had
                                                
5 See Hall (1992) for the properties of the percentile method bootstrap.  This correction assumes that the bias, b, is
constant across all possible values of b.  To test this we used the regressors to generate Ci** = Xi b ˆ  + ei and a normally
distributed sample selection method and averaged the estimated bias over 1,000 trials.  Comparing this bias estimate to
those created from the same process but different parameter values b* yielded essentially identical estimates.12
final interviews between June 1983, and May 1984 were  selected and their responses
annualized. This entire process results in a sample size of 2,347 households.
Contributions are defined as either the sum of giving to religious, educational and
social welfare organizations (CHARITY) or simply as giving to social welfare
organizations (SOCIAL).  Although the CEX does contain household tax payment
information, it omits marginal tax rates. The values of federal, state and local income
taxes and marginal tax rates are therefore simulated for each year of the study period,
using an iterative algorithm developed for computation of the tax-and-price index (TPI).
For more information on this algorithm, see Appendix 2.
Contributions are defined as contributions to religious, educational and social
welfare organizations.  As described previously, the tax-price of giving is one for non-
itemizers and one minus the applicable marginal tax rate for itemizers.  It is defined as
P
m m b m m b m mb
b m m








where mf is marginal federal tax rate, ms is the marginal state tax rate, d is equal to one if
the household itemizes and zero otherwise, bd is the equal to one if deductions are al-
lowed on a state return and zero otherwise, and bf is equal to one if the household can
deduct federal taxation from their state return and zero otherwise.
Although a measure of current income exists, we instead use a measure of
permanent income: the sum of all household expenditures except charitable giving.  For
examples of this approach in general, see Prais and Houthakker (1971). For an example
of this with the use of the CEX, see Nelson (1989).13
Unlike tax data, the CEX includes variables for age, education, and race of the
head of household, all of which are included here.  To allow for the effect of government
expenditures upon the probability of making a contribution, we include a variable made
up of the per capita government expenditures on AFDC, Supplemental Security Income,
and Food Stamps in the household’s metropolitan statistical area.
RESULTS
In this section we show that price elasticity estimates from several parametric
methods exceed unity while the semi-parametric estimate does not.  However, standard
tests of the distributional assumptions necessary for the consistency of the commonly
used Heckman and tobit estimators strongly rejects the null hypothesis that we are using
the correct distributions.  This suggests that price elasticity estimates in much previous
work are too high, although the semiparametric estimate is similar to low estimates found
in recent work by Broman (1989), Randolph (1995) and Barrett, McGuirk and Steinberg
(1997) using tax file data.
However, our initial definition of charity and the tax file definition includes
religious giving.  Here the idea of the federal government payments replacing private
contributions – the thought experiment behind treasury efficiency – isn’t realistic. When
we restrict our definition to the more reasonable definition of giving to social welfare
organizations, our elasticity estimate exceeds one.  It is possible, then, that previous
estimates are too high and that the charitable giving deduction is treasury efficient.
The coefficient estimates derived from using parametric regression methods on
CHARITY, defined as giving religious, educational and social welfare organizations14
are listed in Table 2. Because we use a log-linear model, the coefficient estimates on
income and price can be interpreted as elasticities.  The first two columns contain
estimates from regressions using standard 2SLS methods on the entire dataset and on the
set of contributors, respectively.
In the first column of Table 2 are the results from a naive 2SLS regression
without considering the censoring problem.   The estimate is significantly greater than
unity.  But because approximately 40 percent of the  households do not give, these
estimates should be biased and inconsistent.  A 2SLS regression on just the observations
is also biased, but produces an elasticity less than one, although not significantly so.
In the third column we list the results from the Heckman model of Lee, Maddala
and Trost (1980).  Again the price elasticity estimate exceeds one, although it is
insignificantly different from one.  This estimate is only consistent if the normality
assumption in the first stage is satisfied.  But using the test of Bera, Jarque and Lee
(1984) we find a statistic of 26.93, which is a rejection at any usual significance level for
a c
2(2) distribution.  This estimate is therefore biased and inconsistent.
As an alternative we use the full information maximum likelihood tobit model in
Greene (1995).  This again yields an estimated price elasticity well in excess of one.  This
model, however, also relies on the assumption of normality of the disturbance.  If this
assumption is violated the estimates are biased and inconsistent.  Using the test of Pagan
and Vella (1989) for censored normality we find a statistic of 758, which is a rather
strong rejection for a c
2(2) distribution.
This leaves the semi-parametric estimates, which are consistent without making
assumptions about the distribution of the disturbances.  But before describing the results15
the bandwidth selection method needs explanation. Our technique relies on the fact that
plots of coefficient estimates as a function of bandwidths have a clear interpretation.
Specifically, when the bandwidths are very high the coefficient estimate is the
same as 2SLS on the censored data.
6  This occurs because high bandwidths tend to
weight data equally.  As the bandwidths shrink, at some point the coefficient estimates
change.  This occurs because the estimated probability of selection,  $ Fi , begins to affect
the weights  $ wijn, which in turn differentially weight the observations.
As expected the coefficients invariably move towards their true values.  In some
cases this results in a “plateau”, and in other times a “well”, but in either case the top or
bottom of this region comes closest to the true coefficient estimate.  Still smaller
bandwidths cause the parameter estimates to vary widely with the bandwidth.  This is
analogous to the sensitivity of coefficients estimated with a small number of
observations: the addition or subtraction of a few observations can dramatically change
the estimate.
In figure one we show the results of this experiment on our data.  At the very high
bandwidths one can see that the coefficient estimate for price is –0.73.  This corresponds
to the censored 2SLS estimate in Table 2.  At a sufficiently small pair of bandwidths we
find a well.  The bottom of this well represents our choice for bandwidths.  Beyond this
point one can see sharp fluctuations in the parameter values, as mentioned.  Figure 2 plots
the kernel density with the selected bandwidths as a function of income.
                                                
6 See Holden (1999) for proof.16
Table 3 lists our bias-corrected parameter estimates and confidence intervals
using our chosen bandwidths.  The results are remarkably similar to those found from the
censored 2SLS.  The interpretation of this is that there is, in fact, very little selection bias
and that the different estimates of the Heckman and tobit models are the result of mis-
specification of the likelihood function.  Although not significantly below one, the
coefficient estimate is well below the other estimates.  Because our price and income
variables are defined using a measure of permanent income, this estimate can be
compared to the estimates of long-run elasticity found in Broman (1989), Randolph
(1995) and Barrett, McGuirk and Steinberg (1997).
  But because this definition of giving includes religious giving, its price elasticity
is not of use when drawing inferences about treasury efficiency.  The results from
repeating the entire experiment for giving to social welfare organizations, SOCIAL, is
listed in Tables 4 and 5.  In this case even 2SLS on the censored data produces a
parameter estimate in excess of unity although again not significantly so.  A likely reason
for this is that religious giving is much less sensitive to the tax price than other forms of
giving.  Again the tests for the distributional assumptions necessary for the consistency of
the Heckman and tobit estimates reject the null hypothesis:  34.15 in  the case of the
Bera, Jarque and Lee test and 811.01 in the case of the Pagan and Vella test.  The
semiparametric estimate again is close to the censored 2SLS model and so it exceeds
unity.  This implies that the deduction may be treasury efficient.17
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we employ a semiparametric technique to estimate a model of
charitable giving.  Our results show that price elasticities are substantially lower with this
method than with maximum likelihood methods.  However, tests on the maximum
likelihood models show that they are misspecified.  The low elasticity estimates of the
semi-parametric approach are similar to those produced from panel data and suggest that
many previous estimates are too high.  But if one takes the idea of treasury efficiency
seriously, then the elasticity of giving to all sources is less meaningful than the elasticity
of giving to social welfare organizations.  Semi-parametric estimates using this definition
find an elasticity greater than one.  This implies that it is possible for many previous
estimates of the price elasticity to be too high but still have the deduction for
contributions be treasury efficient.18
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Table 1a: Descriptive Statistics: Full sample (N=2347)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Charity>0 (1424 observations) 541.93 929.28 1.00 9388.55
Social>0 (963 observations) 138.87 284.10 1.00 5000.00
Price 0.88 0.17 0.43 1.00
Income 12974.84 9320.38 174.43 102024.60
Race 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
Education 3.42 1.47 1.00 7.00
Age 43.63 17.91 17.00 94.00
Table 1b: Descriptive Statistics: Contributors only (N=1424)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Charity>0 (1424 observations) 541.93 929.28 1.00 9388.55
Price 0.84 0.17 0.43 1.00
Income 15087.36 9703.55 602.25 102024.60
Race 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
Education 3.57 1.47 1.00 7.00
Age 45.81 17.26 17.00 93.00
Table 1c: Descriptive Statistics: Social welfare contributors only (N=963)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Social>0 (963 observations) 138.87 284.10 1.00 5000.00
Price 0.81 0.18 0.43 1.00
Income 16379.07 9863.22 602.25 102024.60
Race 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Education 3.76 1.42 1.00 6.00
Age 45.63 16.58 17.00 92.0021






Price -1.93 -0.73 -1.29 -3.06
(-6.91) (-3.24) (-2.98) (-4.95)
Income 0.95 0.55 0.83 1.48
(12.57) (8.69) (5.261) (10.91)
Race -0.01 0.20 0.11 -0.14
(-0.08) (1.65) (0.764) (-0.59)
Education 0.26 0.15 0.23 0.32
(6.50) (5.25) (4.32) (5.01)
Age 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.05
(10.74) (7.39) (4.25) (9.17)
Constant -8.11 -1.41 -5.79 19.01
(0.69) (-2.39) (-2.42) (-7.44)
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses
Table 3: Semiparametric Estimates: Dependent Variable = CHARITY
Confidence Interval
Variable Estimate 5% point 95% point
Price -0.78 -1.08 -0.48
Income 0.56 0.47 0.64
Race 0.17 -0.01 .34
Education 0.16 0.12 0.20
Age*10 0.18 0.15 0.2222






Price -2.56 -1.36 -0.99 -4.28
(-10.60) (-6.48) (-1.79) (-7.12)
Income 0.53 0.36 0.31 1.56
(9.27) (5.40) (1.99) (9.06)
Race -0.11 0.03 -.07 -0.49
(-0.95) (0.24) (0.50) (-1.64)
Education 0.22 0.15 0.12 0.47
(7.41) (5.02) (2.0) (6.18)
Age 0.02 0.007 0.05 0.04
(6.85) (2.93) (0.97) (6.14)
Constant -5.06 -0.59 0.48 -23.50
(-9.59) (-0.92) (0.19) (-7.50)
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses
Table 5: Semiparametric Estimates: Dependent Variable = SOCIAL
Confidence Interval
Variable Estimate 5% point 95% point
Price -1.34 -1.61 -1.08
Income 0.38 0.29 0.46
Race 0.03 -0.12 0.18
Education 0.15 0.11 0.19
Age*10 0.07 0.03 0.1023
APPENDIX 1
Here we discuss some of the application issues when using the Ahn and Powell model.
For consistency of  $ b  the kernels and the bandwidths in both stages must  satisfy
regularity conditions which force the bias from the two non-parametric stages to
converge to zero at a rate faster than  n.  Achieving this requires the use of “higher
order kernels.”  The weighting kernel, k() in the second stage must satisfy:
ulk u du l ( ) ,2, = z 1 3 while the second stage band width, bn, must be







.  Denoting m as the number of continuous right hand side
regressors, K() in the first stage must satisfy the system:
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where N(0,C) is the density of normal vector, and d is the convergence rate of the second
stage bandwidth.  The first stage bandwidth, hn, must be O n
M
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Notice that the regularity conditions of the window width convergence and the order of
the kernels are interdependent.24
APPENDIX 2
The TPI algorithm links specific tax code parameters to income, expenditure, and
demographic information for a calendar year. A detailed description of this algorithm is
contained in Gillingham and Greenlees (1987) and Kokoski (1990).  Given the available
household-specific information, the algorithm simulates the household's tax liability,
including eligibility and amounts of tax credits, exemptions, and deductions at the
federal, state and local levels, as well as the FICA tax.  Simulated tax payments and
marginal tax rates are based upon permanent income, computed from the aggregate of the
consumption expenditures of the household.  The algorithm endogenizes the decision to
itemize based upon the criterion of which option results in the smaller tax payment, thus
producing observations of household charitable contributions by both itemizers and non-
itemizers.  To reconcile the calendar year tax expenditures with the survey period of the
households, the imputed tax rates and payments are averaged across the years represented
by each household's survey period.  Thus, for a household surveyed from June 1983 to
May 1984, its marginal tax rate is 7/12 of the 1983 rate plus 5/12 of the 1984 rate.
Information on tax rules is derived from federal publications: Individual Income
Tax Returns, and Your Federal Income Tax (Internal Revenue Service Publication 17) for
the relevant years. Exemptions include those for taxpayer, spouse, dependents, and
elderly status, although  blind individuals could not be distinguished in the CEX data.
Deductions include: medical care costs, state and local taxes, interest payments,
charitable contributions, and certain nonconsumption expenditures, such as union dues
and rental of safe deposit boxes. Surcharges, earned income credits (EICs), the Credit for25
the Elderly, the exemption for contributions to an Individual Retirement Account (IRA),
and special credits for couples when both work were incorporated into the computations
in the years for which they applied. Information on the FICA tax, is from the Social
Security Administration.  State and local income taxes are from annual issues of the State
Tax Handbook and the State Tax Guide, both publications of the Commerce Clearing
House, Inc.  It is assumed that all taxpayers itemized deductions in computing their state
tax and that there are no variations among states in the deductions for interest, energy
conservation investments, medical care expenses, and other miscellaneous deductions.
Because we do not have complete data on sales and excise tax rates by state and local
areas we assume that there is a single rate of 4.075 per cent for items that are generally
not exempted from this tax.26
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